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RIGHTS RESPIRATION: DISABILITY,
ISOLATION, AND A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF INTERACTION
Allan H. Macurdyt
In 1772, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, presided
over a case involving a slave, James Somerset, who had been brought
by his master from Virginia to England and who claimed that his simple presence on English soil made him free.' Among Somerset's lawyers was one Francis Hargrave, who was arguing the first case of his
career that day. Hargrave maintained that "the Air of England was
too pure for slavery,"' 2 quoting the advocate in a prior case and drawing upon the commonly held understanding that slavery was incompatible with a society of rights, and that it deprived the individual of
the very indicia of humanity. Asking rhetorically whether the law of a
lowly colony or a barbarous state should prevail over the law of England, Hargrave declared that "[i]n England ... freedom is the grand
object of the laws, and dispensed to the meanest individual."3
By virtue of being human, the "meanest individual" is entitled to
the fundamental rights of Englishmen, which antecede the law created
for their preservation. Indeed, as articulated later in the case by Hargrave's co-counsel John Alleyne, an individual cannot part with the
rights "vested by nature and society . . . without ceasing to be a
[human being]; for they immediately flow from, and are essential to,
his condition as such . . . ." Lord Mansfield agreed, declaring that
slavery was "so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
positive law" 5-and that, therefore, "the black must be discharged." 6
It is remarkable, at least arguably, that an English court in the 1770s
might agree that individuals only need to be human in order to be
entitled to rights and are equal because they possess those rights. The
idea has since gone on to become an essential part of human rights
t Visiting Professor, Boston University School of Law. This essay is a cleanedup version of my remarks presented at the 2006 Gloucester Conference, Too Pure an
Air: Law and the Quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality, June 2006. My thanks to
Reginald Oh and the other Conference organizers for their gracious support as well as
our panel moderator, James McGrath, and co-panelists, Seema Mohapatra and
Timothy S. Hall, who made it work with me in absentia. Thanks as well to the editors
of the Texas Wesleyan Law Review. The essay is part of a larger project examining
human rights lessons from law and disability. For research and other support thanks
to Sean Gavin BUSL 2007 and Lhundhrup Dorje. As always, my work is dedicated to
Marie Trottier Macurdy, my life and my inspiration.
1. See Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).
2. Id. at 501.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 502.
5. Id. at 510.
6. Id.
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discourse. Anchored within the recognition of the equal dignity of all
humans, such a perspective posits that equality flows from the universal value of being human. It does, however, stand in marked contrast
to the bulk of U.S. constitutional doctrine around equal protection,
which largely disconnects equality from rights, proceeding as if they
are conceptually independent legal theories. Instead, the prevailing
equal protection model proceeds on the assumption that any governmental distinction is acceptable, subject only to rationality, unless the
distinction excludes an individual who is arguably just like the paradigm of the white, property-owning male citizen, except for a traitlike race-that is not relevant to the contextual determination.
Such an approach has venerable roots and must be seen as part of
the nation's efforts to remedy the legacy of slavery since Reconstruction. Thus, in state government, and especially in the administration
of justice, in the electoral process, and in economic life, a black is entitled to-at least formally-the same position as that of the white,
property-owning male. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in rejecting racial
prejudice in property and contract, has noted that the Constitution
requires that "a dollar in the hands" of a black man be equal to one
held by the white man.7
Equality as a universal value stemming from an individual's possession of fundamental rights has a long and notable history in U.S. constitutional law, but it has been neglected in recent decades in favor of
a model of class membership.8 The question is reduced to whether the
individual falls within a "suspect class," an idea that has come to be
understood as membership in an identifiable group with a history of
exclusion and political powerlessness, roughly descriptive of the condition of blacks in the aftermath of slavery. If an individual has been
discriminated against on the basis of a class that is suspect-like
race-current equal protection doctrine requires that a court employ
heightened scrutiny to closely examine the factual context, including
the government's justifications for the distinction. Unlike our model
in Somerset, equality as an actionable legal interest flows from similarity to an archetype, rather than from an individual's status as a human
in possession of rights. To be sure, distinctions that implicate fundamental rights are also to be examined closely under the formula in
7. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
8. Admittedly, the use of heightened judicial scrutiny where the plaintiff is a
member of a protected or suspect class developed in response to the need to more
closely examine the factual context of governmental distinctions in the face of historic
and systematic exclusion of specific populations. Rigid application of a rational relation test had often left courts unable to look behind official explanations and evaluate
state behavior in light of important constitutional interests. The unfortunate by-product of this membership scheme, however, is that conduct that is clearly invidious, or
that implicates important constitutional interests, will evade judicial scrutiny and legal
remedy because an individual does not fit within a previously recognized protected
738
category.
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footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,9 but such challenges are not well represented in appellate opinions. Thus, "suspectness" has become the legal mask for groups who are required to argue
that they should be protected because they are just like white males.
While this approach has been largely responsible for dismantling oppressive legal structures that give official life to similar prejudice, it is
far less effective in combating exclusion where the disadvantaged individual does not as closely resemble the archetypical white male.
Individuals with disabilities have discovered that availing themselves of the Equal Protection remedy has proven problematic, but
their experience is similar to that of other groups, particularly women.
Kathryn Abrams has pointed out that rigid, unitary conceptions of discrimination have failed to remedy many forms of injustice against women who fall outside of those conceptions and actually reinforce
gender stereotypes. ° While it will be useful to examine her taxonomy
of legal approaches to gender in order to fully frame an examination
of disutility of the suspect class methodology for injustices based upon
disability, here it is sufficient to note that, like gender, disability discrimination is not entirely captured by concepts of equality or difference. Both theories describe the excluded individual with reference to
the dominant trait or traits-male, able-bodied, etc.-and proceed on
the assumption that "inequality could be traced to something inherent
in them-rather than something that had been done to them."' 1 This
leads the observer to believe that any exclusion is a logical and necessary outgrowth of that difference.
Such a perspective plays into the exertion of power to keep majority
norms at the center of the discussion to maintain the mythical image
of perfect ability to which persons with disabilities cannot conform. If
this is familiar territory, it is because the medical model finds that individuals with disabilities cannot fulfill "expected social roles" solely
because of their medical conditions, transforming a functional analysis
into a model of social deviance. But rather than being "natural and
immutable," the relative disadvantages faced by persons with disabilities are socially constructed, the result of a physically and attitudinally
engineered environment that is "artificial," reflecting collective decisions that are therefore subject to change.
But because these constructed differences appear to be obvious, attempts to vindicate constitutional norms of nondiscrimination for persons with disabilities have proven to be difficult, particularly in cases
where the contextual determination may have no analogue among the
so-called able-bodied. This difficulty stems, at least in significant part,
from the view that equality is a function of an individual's similarity to
9. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
10. Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48
(1997)
11. Id. at 872.
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the archetypical white able-bodied male, rather than the natural outgrowth of their common humanity. So protection is accorded only if
able and disabled are the same, and only if the disabled person can do
everything the able-bodied person can do.
But to agree with this proposition one must abandon the attempt to
transform institutions that were not designed with disabled people in
mind and cede the field to an "able-centric" approach that continues
to focus upon the values and interests of the non-disabled population.
As Abrams points out, equality theory fails to provide the analytical
tools to challenge such institutions to take the experiences of excluded
populations and transform our vision of a just society.12 The equality
edifice is unstable because it fails to clearly identify subordination as
an affront to all of us as humans, cleaving to a membership scheme
that permits conduct that is clearly discriminatory to evade legal redress because an individual does not fit within a previously recognized
protected category.
The subordination of individuals with disabilities in our society begins with their differentiation-the application of a label that reduces
them to a single characteristic. On that basis, society and the legal
system perpetuate and maintain the belief that those designated as
disabled are truly different from the rest of us. It should not be surprising-although it may be-that the conclusions we draw about the
disability experience are true of all human existence. First, one cannot be defined accurately in terms of a single attribute rather than a
complex set of components. That is, the whole of the individual is not
described by the label of disability because each of us is made up of a
bundle of abilities, and lack of abilities, of elemental traits. For society and the legal system to treat individuals as if they were merely a
singular label is unjust.
Second, and flowing from the previous point, because we possess
certain abilities and lack others, we must depend upon other people to
do things and provide things for us. None of us, whether or not we
have disabilities, can accomplish any of our civic, economic, or social
objectives, nor can we exercise autonomy, apart from the organic,
foundational relationships we form and live within, rather than our
separation from others. Thus, independence from others is not only
myth but is pernicious, imposing isolation by impeding the development of relationships.
Third, the allocation of abilities and lack of abilities is not static, but
ever-changing. As children we can do things that we cannot do as
adults; when adults, there are many things we can do that we could
not do as children. Disease, accident, and "failure to use" can take
away abilities while experience, training, and education can augment
our bundle of abilities. Any assessment of equality cannot, then, be
12. See id. at 869.
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valid without paying close attention to the context of an individual's
situation because the label of disability is not even stable for a particular individual.
Its instability not withstanding, applying the label of disability-like
any other membership label-creates a perception of actual difference, causes other people to accept the characteristics attached to that
label, and results in profound isolation. When a parent pulls a curious
child away from a person with a visible disability; when a crowd recedes disproportionately away from a group of children with disabilities in a shopping mall; or when a waitperson looks past a person with
a disability to take the dinner order of his or her non-disabled companion, each actor draws upon a received ideology and validates it
through further observation through the ideological lens. All this
would be a purely internal process with arguably fewer social implications, except that by acting, the actor reinforces and transmits that
ideological imagery to others, replete with stereotypical assumptions.
Here, each actor evidences the belief that the life of the person with a
disability is full of tragedy, isolation, and incapacity. Each concludes
that the person with a disability is incapable of communicating, unable
to participate, or simply too unhappy to connect with other people.
More disturbingly, each conveys the idea that such people should be
avoided if not actually feared. Why? Because we want to avoid thinking about what-to us-is a terrible life situation; our fear requires
that we avoid-or not see-individuals with disabilities. 13 Comments
such as "I do not know how I would do it," "You are braver than I
would be," or rather less kindly, "I would rather be dead than live like
that,"' 4 can be seen as outward manifestations of the observer's psy13. As Milner Ball has put it, "Blindness to people may be of a piece with their
oppression." Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1855, 1856 (1990).
14. Harlan Hahn, a sociologist who has examined societal perceptions of disability, distinguishes between two sorts of anxieties experienced by non-disabled persons
when faced with individuals with disabilities: aesthetic and existential anxiety. Simply
put, aesthetic anxiety is fear or avoidance of an individual because that person looks
different-that is, in a way at variance with majority norms of beauty or function.
This anxiety occurs not only in encounters with individuals who have visible facial
disfigurements or amputations, but wheelchair users, individuals with speech impediments, and those with tremors or spasticity as well. Perhaps this constitutes prejudice
at its most elemental, echoing the primeval experiences of humans living in insulated
clans or villages with little contact with "others." But it is traditional prejudice without the "alien-ness"-individuals born with, or acquiring, disabilities were native babies, neighbors, or kin. They shared the experiences of family, clan or village life in
common with those without disabilities, and still met rejection and fear. Prejudice
grounded in outward appearance or communicative differences operates in a similar
way across several forms of difference, yet this level of "otherness" construction is
foundational, an initial impulse upon which to build a complete ideology. Hahn's existential anxiety may describe a characteristic unique to disability-based prejudice. An
observer may be made uncomfortable in the presence of an individual with a disability not simply because that person looks "different," but also because of an aversion
to thinking about that person's life as if it were the observer's own life. That is, be741
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chological process of fear-avoidance. Not only is there fear of disability fueled by stereotype, but also by fear of acknowledging another's
pain, recognizing someone else's courage, and comprehending the injustices others endure as people of feeling who are marginalized and
devalued. Thus the ideology sets and legitimates a profound social
distance that reinforces the perception that the lives of individuals
with disabilities are universally tragic, depressing, and even pointless.
It is not surprising, then, that interactions with individuals with disabilities are stilted, awkward, or non-existent.1 5 When others recoil
from acknowledging you or simply assume you are incapable of participation, no one hears your perspective and societal norms and value
hierarchies go unexamined and unchallenged.1 6 The absence of conversation between us is unremarkable because the lives of individuals
with disabilities have been "marginalized," rendered irrelevant by adherence to false visions of perfect ability and mythical autonomy.
Such isolation stigmatizes, denies our social nature, and impedes the
exercise of human rights.
The experiences of individuals with disabilities illustrate that we
have yet to truly understand that equality is not the result of conformance to a unitary norm, not a feature of lines that separate us, but is
enabled by our interdependence. This, of course, is not necessarily a
new perspective. In Somerset, Hargrave maintained that the rights of
all Englishmen are threatened if anyone in England remained a
slave-a view that rests upon a profound insight that freedom is not
found in isolation but in our very interdependence.' 7 Whether one
embraces the genuine equality of all individuals, or simply believes
that the "meanest individual" is the canary-in-a-mine-shaft that warns
us of deterioration in the atmosphere of freedom, slavery cannot be
permitted. As your bondage threatens my liberty, my freedom depends upon yours.
This is a conception of equality that rests upon the reality of our
social nature as well as the recognition of the universality of human
value. Freedom, our ability to be autonomous, to live "subject to
[our] own law" is only possible within a web of human relationships.
As Jennifer Nedelsky once noted, "[R]elatedness is not, as our tradicause the observer wants to avoid thinking about what to him is a terrible life situation, his fear requires that he avoid-or not see-individuals with disabilities. See
Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination,J.
Soc. IssuEs 39, 42-46 (1988).
15. For example, when dining out, it has been very common for those serving the
meal to be unsure how to proceed with me at the table. Common reactions are to
speak to me in a voice reserved for children, yell at me, "What do you want to order?(!)," or ask my dinner partners what "he would like to have." I have watched a
waitress pick up three menus, look over at the three of us in the booth, put one down,
and give menus to my two companions.
16. See Ball, supra note 13.
17. See Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500-01 (K.B.).
742
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tion teaches, the antithesis of autonomy, but a literal precondition of
autonomy, and interdependence a constant component of
autonomy."18
But the importance of interdependence is even greater. It does
more than simply enable our autonomy. Each of our fundamental
rights cannot be exercised, and are actually meaningless, apart from
that complex web of relationships. Free expression is fruitless apart
from a society able to respond; voting can affect nothing without other
voters and political actors; freedom of belief lacks value without
others of like belief to gather around or public officials to influence;
and the right to die with dignity has no meaning unless others support
and implement the decision. To see rights within the context of our
social existence is to realize that interaction is essential to their
exercise.
The social relations theory of freedom, an understanding of equality
as a result of our interconnectedness, enables us to examine familiar
legal disputes and Supreme Court equal protection doctrine in a very
different light. Let us begin with arguably the most famous-and certainly the most talked about-civil rights decision, Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. 9 In Brown, the Court considered whether "segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprive[s] the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?" 20
In a remarkably empathetic opinion, Chief Justice Warren declared
that separation from other students of similar age and abilities on the
basis of race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone,"2 1 and that such a "'sense of inferiority [in turn]
affects the motivation of a child to learn."' 2 2 On the basis of that psychological evidence, the Court concluded that separate schools were
inherently unequal.
This is all familiar enough so far, but I am asking that you allow me
the chance to shift how you perceive this seminal case. We generally
regard Brown as standing for the proposition that, because of our history of racial inequality, the separation of children on the basis of race
is unconstitutional because it stigmatizes black children by conveying
to them, as well as to society, that such children are inferior. I, of
course, agree with this point of view, but I believe we can tease out a
more complete understanding of the interests at stake in the Topeka
public schools.
18. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989).
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Id. at 493.
21. Id. at 494.
22. Id. (quoting in part the district court below in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.
Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
-7,
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By incorporating the psychological dimensions of discrimination,
Warren undertakes a startlingly different approach from earlier equality cases, but he is not quite able to convey the complete nature of the
damage to the child or society. The phrase "separate is inherently
unequal" identifies separation as the cause of inequality, which is the
harm to black children. More precisely, these children are harmed by
the stigma of inferiority brought about by their separation from other
children on the basis of race. In this view, separation is not the harm;
it is the immediate cause of the harm.
But, I submit that separation serves more than one role. First, in
addition to causing stigma, separate schools, lunch counters,
restrooms, and neighborhoods are the result of racial inequality in our
society which is a manifestation of white supremacy. More significantly for our purposes, separation is also a cognizable harm in itself.
In Brown, the Chief Justice cited a prior decision requiring that a
black graduate student be treated like all other students.
In that case, the Court noted that the black students' "ability to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession" 23 was intrinsic to an
equal educational opportunity. Likewise, Warren quoted from one of
the lower court opinions that a "'sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn"' 2 4 and, therefore, limits his or her educational development.
Thus, separation harms by impeding
interaction.
Interaction is part of what Chief Justice Warren is concerned about
when he notes that in a graduate education 'study[ing], . . . en26
gag[ing] in discussions and exchang[ing] views with other students"'
is essential. To him, "[s]uch considerations apply with added force to
children in grade and high schools." 27 Indeed, he went on to describe
the purpose and importance of public education to our democratic
society. Public education is necessary to the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities and, thus, is the foundation of good citizenship. Indeed, it is vital to the maintenance of healthy
democracies.28
23. Id. at 493 (quoting McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
24. Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 493 (quoting McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
27. Id. at 494.
28. Howard Thurman, civil rights leader and spiritual mentor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., once stated:
[M]eaningful and creative experiences between people can be more compelling
than all the ideas, concepts, faiths, fears, ideologies, and prejudices that divide them;
and absolute faith that if such experiences can be multiplied and sustained over a time
interval of sufficient duration any barrier that separates one person from another can
be undermined and eliminated.
HOWARD THURMAN, WITH HEAD AND HEART 148 (1979).
744

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss2/21
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.20

8

Macurdy: Rights Respiration: Disability, Isolation, and a Constitutional R

2007]

RIGHTS RESPIRATION

More significantly for our purposes, Warren described public education as "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values ...and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. '29 Notice that all of these considerations are left unaddressed in the absence
of unimpeded personal interaction. These themes are picked up by
Justice Marshall's dissent in 1972 in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez,3" where he emphasized that "the majority's holding [demonstrates] . . . unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives
children in their3 1earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens.,
Another case that can be reconsidered within the context of interaction is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Independent Living Center, Inc.3 2
The Center, along with several individuals, challenged a city zoning
ordinance requiring issuance of a special use permit for a group home
for individuals with mental retardation. They alleged that the zoning
ordinance, on its face and as applied, violated the equal protection
rights of the Center and its potential residents. The City argued that
the ordinance should be upheld because of the negative attitudes of
nearby property owners, fears of elderly residents, and the danger that
the residents of the group home would be to subject to harassment.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, surprised few observers
when he determined that individuals with mental retardation were not
a suspect class. Normally the City's justifications would be taken at
face value, but because he was convinced that the City's objectives
were illegitimate, Powell concluded that the refusal to grant a specialuse permit was based upon irrational prejudice against individuals
with mental retardation. Finding that the ordinance-at least as applied-represented "arbitrary or irrational"3 3 action and was based
upon a 'bare ...desire to harm a politically unpopular group,"' 34 he
invalidated the ordinance as invidious discrimination.3 5
Interestingly for our purposes, Justice Powell mentioned, but did
not consider, application of the third component of the definition, noting that individuals with mental retardation "have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be treated
equally by the law." 36 Had he considered it carefully, Powell would
certainly have recognized the fundamental nature of the right to live
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
30. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. Id. at 71 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
32. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
33. Id. at 446.
34. Id. at 446-47 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
35. Id. at 450.
36. Id. at 447.
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where you wish as articulated by the Supreme Court across a variety
of cases ranging from the invalidation of inordinately lengthy residency requirements for state benefits to prohibitions on racially-discriminatory zoning regulations. On that basis, he could have
grounded his model of equality upon the universality of human rights
rather than membership.
But there is a more significant level of understanding to be set out.
Rather than simply an application of the fundamental right to live
where one wishes, the Court's decision can be seen as the preservation
of a fundamental constitutional value of interaction upon which all
other rights depend. This is particularly poignant since group homes
are a manifestation of the therapeutic understanding that individuals
with mental retardation are able to develop significant life skills when
placed in community settings where they can be immersed in everyday
human interactions.
Like the critical function of public schools, interaction serves both
the therapeutic purposes of group homes and the constitutional values
springing from our interdependence. For a human being to truly possess autonomy, to exercise her fundamental rights, barriers to full interaction must be removed. Thus, the principles of antidiscrimination
recognize the destructive power of isolation and seek to protect this
core value of human interaction upon which our freedoms and our
democracy depends. Isolation not only obstructs the achievement of
the purposes of education or community placement, it also results in a
deterioration of an individual's freedom.
How would this right of interaction work? To explore this question,
I place the facts of a Supreme Court special-education case within a
constitutional framework, issues not considered in the original case.
Amy Rowley was a bright eight-year-old attending elementary school
in a town in New York. Amy happened to be deaf and was, by many
estimates, doing quite well academically despite only comprehending
50% of what was being said in the classroom by her teacher and classmates. Deeply concerned about their daughter's educational opportunities, the Rowleys requested that the school system provide sign
language interpreters so that Amy could fully benefit from, and participate in, her education.
When the school system refused, the family brought suit under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), which guaranteed every
schoolchild the right to a free appropriate public education. 3 7 Among
the statute's requirements was that a school system provide students
with related services including "such developmental, corrective, and
other support services ... as may be required to assist a child with a
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a), (d) (2000).
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At the Supreme
disability to benefit from special education . "..."38
Court, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute requires maximum educational benefit.
Instead, he noted that Congress sought to make public education
available to students with disabilities, and thus "did not impose upon
the States any greater substantive educational standard than would be
necessary to make such access meaningful."3 9 As the intent of the act
was to open the door to public education but not guarantee any particular level of education, the family's request was denied.
Justice White's dissent brings us back to the idea of equal educational opportunity first advanced in Brown. He noted that the purpose of the statute is to "eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least
to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn
if that is reasonably possible."4 Because without the interpreter Amy
comprehends less than half of what hearing students comprehend in
the classroom, White concluded that "[t]his is hardly an equal opportunity to learn, even if Amy makes passing grades."'" Further, the
statute also contains a preference for mainstreaming students with disabilities into regular classrooms where possible. Clearly, both the
statute and Justice White convey the understanding that education requires not only that a teacher communicate with a student who then
learns, but that learning actually happens through immersion in constant and complex interaction amongst student, teacher, and
classmates.
Thus, as mainstreaming is simply a mechanism to ensure that students with disabilities get to interact with their peers, and sign language interpreting permits that interaction to occur, the issue should
be framed as whether the denial of interpreting impaired her interaction with teaching and classmates, and thus violated Amy's right to
equal educational opportunity.4 2 Clearly, the failure to provide interpreting implicates all of the issues we have already raised in the context of segregation, but because it singles out a specific child for
isolation, it is far more destructive of her self-esteem and far more
damaging to her individual development, and thus should be considered a far greater constitutional violation. It also notably impairs the
right of all the hearing students to interaction with this very bright
student. An emphasis upon the mutual benefit of interaction can
transform the nature of our equal protection jurisprudence-tran38. Id. § 1401(22).
39. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrik Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
192 (1982).
40. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Had the family brought a discrimination claim under the 1973 Rehabilitation
Act, the issue would have been whether the denial of a reasonable accommodationsign language interpreting-impaired Amy's right to equality of access to her
education.
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scending the
evils of membership with an appreciation for our diverse
43
humanity.
In his Letter from the Birmingham City Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
declared that "[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single
garment of destiny."'" King understood, and the experiences of individuals with disabilities confirm, that exclusion spills directly from the
denial of our interdependence. Prejudice would have us see no connection between ourselves and others, and therefore no reason to acknowledge or respect our common humanity. Systematic and
pervasive impediments to human interaction in the significant arenas
of human life are corrosive of individual dignity and the maintenance
of community, and thus isolation should be seen to be at a heart of the
evil to be combated through our constitutional protections.
Indeed, the purpose of all civil rights statutes implementing those
protections is to enhance and ensure human interaction for the sake of
human rights, the health of our democracy, and our common humanity. James Somerset, upon his arrival in England, breathed in the pure
air of rights, air that carried to him the holy symbols of his humanity.
As all of us take in from the same air, slavery cannot be allowed to
exist because it poisons the atmosphere of rights upon which our humanity depends. Each relies upon the other to protect the air, and
each is necessary to the effectuation of rights that have no meaning or
consequence except within a web of relationship. Rights respiration
can only occur within our social context, and thus isolation constitutes
social asphyxiation and the death of self.
43. For example, consider the situation of a Muslim student in a public school in a
predominantly Christian community. If the only way this student could attend public
school is if he were allowed several prayer breaks during the school day, would a
refusal to permit such breaks violate not only his rights but those of his classmates to
a diverse, representative atmosphere of interaction?
44. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (April 16, 1963), available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/ArticlesGen/Letter-Birmingham.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
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